John Philoponus on One Incarnate Nature of God the Logos

John Philoponus (c. 490 - c. 570) is Christian theologian and philosopher who lived in Alexandria. His most important contribution was writing extensive commentaries on works of Aristotle. He was the first  philosopher who argued against eternity of world positing impossibility of infinities in real world. The credit for this argument went eventually to Kalam philosophers in Islamic world (now known as Kalam Cosmological Argument). His works were major source of reference for later Islamic philosophers who expanded upon the works of Aristotle. He was also a proponent of non-Chalcedonian (Miaphysite) Christology. This is a treatise he wrote in defense of Miaphysite Christology.

The book of John the Grammarian of Alexandria, called Philoponus or "lover of work"

First, the Arbiter or examiner of the words of the two sides that contend against each other on the Incarnation of God the Logos

Truth is self-sufficient for its own advocacy with those who ardently regard it with the eye of the soul. But there are many things which obscure reason and pervert right judgment. For personal resentments, empassioned antagonisms, covetousness, ambition, and the fact that one is not expected to turn away from previous misunderstandings by recourse, as it were, to fresh instruction from the truth, will dull the hearing of the soul's tribunal through preference for views once formed. Another point is lack of proper training in logic and lack of skill in reasoning. In addition, sloth and innate sluggishness are impediments for some to departing from previous opinions. We suffer, dear sir, from the following truly lamentable vanity: if somebody propounds to us an enigma from other arts or disciplines in which we happen to be untrained, we are not ashamed very readily to confess ignorance of them. In theology, however, a thing almost incomprehensible to men, which not even the holy powers can worthily lay hold of, anybody who has not even tasted these things with his finger tip, as the saying goes, who has not even, maybe, acquired an elementary knowledge of the alphabet, is embarrassed unless he sets himself up as a precise expert, deeming himself not inferior to one who has spent all his life on the study of logic. It is for this very reason that there is only one who can purify our souls from this sort of suffering.

Our contemporaries, who contend on the holy "Incarnation of the Logos", the majority of them, as it were, except for a few in number, while their opinions largely agree, are only opposed in words to each other; while the one side has agreed to say that after the holy union, which is beyond reason, of the Logos with humanity, they confess one composite nature of Christ, the others have decreed that after the union none the less two natures ought to be predicated, and not one. A sign that their opinions, as I have said, do not conflict with each other is the fact that the majority of our contemporaries do not say these things in controversy. Rather, in every statement which is pronounced by either of them, each side avoids the absurd implications of its opinions; the one of change and alteration of the natures that have come into union, the other of a division into particular hypostases, so that each hypostasis would appear simply on its own, as one can hear from those sick with the impiety of Nestorius who speak of the same union only to the degree of a relationship. For the one party say they name two natures only because of fear of confusion, and the others seek to avoid the term "duality", because they fear dissolving the union; they preserve the property of each nature without confusion, even though the one Christ is recognized by them as the end-product of their composition. Thus the denial of the absurdities believed to attach to each of these propositions is a proof, I think, of agreement in doctrine. You will not find that this happens with the other heresies. For each of them embraces as true doctrines the points criticized by those of orthodox views, and they champion them and imagine that their opponents act impiously. But I hold it to be a feature of the piety of lovers of truth, that each of them can introduce matters which unite the separation created by such controversial language.

Therefore, persuaded by the request of those who have asked us for this response, we too shall examine, as best we can, the contentions mentioned. First, I shall hold fast to sound and God-fearing doctrines and we will state our case by means of an explanation of the terms and by correct arguments and, finally, we will honestly investigate, as best we can, what is said by the opposing sides, to see whether one mode of argument is right. But in order for the proofs to be plain and more suitable to readers, I think it necessary to start by considering what is commonly thought about the Incarnation of our Savior by the devout, so that the proofs may follow from commonly professed ideas and opinions. Thus it is believed in accordance with the Holy Scriptures that the eternal Son, the only begotten Word of the Father, he who is true God from true God, he who is consubstantial with his begetter, in the last age became truly incarnate from the holy Theotokos Mary, and became perfect man, without suffering from any change or alteration in substance, but uniting with himself hypostatically a human body ensouled with a rational and intelligent soul. And as is the case with man, who is an assembly from two natures (that is, a rational soul and a body which is made up of elements that have been mingled out of which the rational living being man has been effected, thus also with Christ. The divine nature of the Logos and the human nature having been united, a single Christ has resulted from the two: not merely a simple union of natures has resulted, as it may be said that God has been united with a man, or a man with a man, while their natures are divided and no single entity has been constituted by each of them, such as, for example, a single man or a single living being. Rather, the relation which for us the body has with respect to the soul governing it, which moves its own impulses, a relation of such kind, in the case of Our Lord Christ, belongs to the whole human entelechy, which is moved by the divinity united to it, as the divinity wills. The rational soul, because of the union with the divinity, becomes, so to speak, moved by God, and has subjected all its rational movements instrumentally to the divine operations of the Logos united with it, since also the body is naturally the proper instrument of the soul. Hence there is one operation through the whole entelechy, which is principally moved by the divinity of Christ Our Lord but proceeds instrumentally through the rational soul united to him, and is completed in the movement of the divine body.

Therefore there was also something more in the Lord Christ, more than anything belonging to our entelechy. For with us we find certain movements proper to the body, for which the soul does not provide the causes. For only in the sort of movements, where the body is moved principally by the soul, can the soul move it. Because it cannot control all the natural faculties of the body for it cannot make something heavy not heavy so that it would not incline downwards nor something hot not heat the things put next to it the body must necessarily also have operations of its own, with no participation of the soul in them owing to its inability to govern them, as it pleases. Therefore it is true to say that such operations are proper to the body. Concerning Our Lord Christ, however, the omnipotent divinity extended to every effect, and hence no natural movement, either of the soul or of the body, simply occurred merely according to the principle of nature, but it was governed by the divinity united to it, in such a manner as seemed good to the divinity: i.e. it transmitted the divine will to the body voluntarily through the mediation of the soul. So, just as in the case of this living being of ours too, one cannot speak of the operations of its double constituted entelechy as belonging to the body or to the soul on its own, but we say that they are common to the completed whole, originating from the soul but completed in the body; in the same way, one also has to speak of Our Lord Christ, because every natural faculty, whether psychic or bodily or of the composite from these two, was controlled by the divinity united to it, and responded to its commands; it is therefore impossible to divide in him any of the operations of those constituents from which the composite was made up. We do not say e.g. that walking belongs to the body alone, or that fulfilling all righteousness belongs to the soul alone or, loosely, to the human nature of Christ, but each operation must be predicated of the completed whole; originating from the divinity as from the principal cause it is completed through the mediation of the soul in the divine body united to it.

The passions occurring naturally to soul and body because of natural sickness which Christ voluntarily assumed as a sign of his true Incarnation, again by the principle of unity, while resulting from a part, are rightly predicated of the completed whole, both by custom and again for the reason that they did not happen without the will of the Logos. Hence we say e.g. of Peter or Paul that they are sick or are struck, though these passions occur only in the body. But to be ignorant or weary or anxious or to hate or to love, these passions, on the other hand, appear to pertain to the soul alone and not to the body. None the less, those which occur in a part we predicate of the completed whole, because of the union of soul and body. Furthermore, just as being human belongs to us through rational soul rather than through organic character of the limbs or using sense perception or being moved or having a body; and as these things are common to other living beings as well, but we have the impress indeed of something superior in us, on account of which we can be called human beings, because the whole species has come into existence through rational soul, since man is a rational living being, and all the passions, that is of soul and body, are predicated of him: so too in the case of Our Lord Christ, we can rightly name the completed whole "God", from the superior of the unified elements, i.e. the divinity which is of its own kind and makes up the completed whole out of those which are fitting, even if he is said to suffer or be weary or be crucified or die. And evidently, while we predicate these operations of the whole as derived from the part, we do not lapse from what is the proper usage. For we do not associate passion with the divinity, because not even in regard to the rational soul do we say that, when a man is sick in body, it wearies, or that the rational soul walks or is divided, or say that anything similar to this occurs to it. Again just as when we say that a man is known to be wise or intelligent from the superior part, which is the soul, we predicate these operations of the whole, so also, though we say of Christ that he works miracles or that he governs the universe "by his word of power", knowing that these are operations of his divinity we attribute them to the whole of him because of the union. But if it is also usual for Scripture to name man from the lesser part, i.e. the flesh, why should it be puzzling, if it also names Christ "man" and "human being"? For unless it called him "God" and "Mighty God" and "God over all" and "God warrior of ages" and "Maker of what is seen and what is unseen" and "He who has brought everything into being through the word of his power", as it is also wont to call men "souls", someone would perhaps be offended, on hearing that Our Lord was called "man" and "human being". Now, however, just as, on hearing "God", I understand together with it truly his humanity also, so too with the appellation "man" I understand that the divine nature is meant together with it.

Having first professed in an orthodox way what is commonly agreed by those who think in a devout manner about the mystery of Christ, we shall go on to examine each point. Do we rightly say that there is one nature of Christ after the union, i.e. a composite and not a simple, or do we necessarily confess that there are two natures after the union viz. that is seen in two natures? If we speak of him as "after the union", this does not mean that the divine flesh of the Logos pre-existed the union, but just as if we said, e.g., "after the garment was whitened" or "after the brass received form", we do not say that, prior to the whitening of the garment, part of the whiteness which has come into it pre-existed, or that, prior to the forming of the brass, part of the form which has come into it pre-existed, but that conceptually these are distinguished, though naturally united, so in the case of Christ. Regarding the customary phrase "after the union", it is evident that the substance of the Logos has existed prior to the ages. The flesh, however, which has been united to him, by assuming existence in relation to him, exists in a way similar to e.g. the partial whiteness in the garment and the part of the form in the brass. "After the union" is to be understood in this way always. It has been examined first, then, since it is natural and follows the understanding of Christians of old to confess "one nature of Christ after the union", though not simple, but composite; and this is presupposed from now on.

First chapter: If we profess that the divine and the human natures of Christ have been united not by any visible property, such as e.g. in honor or in power or in operation or in anything else of that kind, but by what they are qua natures - for this is to profess a union of natures - there are the alternatives: a single entity has resulted from the union, yes or no? So, if a single entity has not resulted from them, how can we even say that they have been united at all? For what else is "to be united" than becoming one? For we do not profess a union by illumination, as in the prophets. Therefore, just as "to be whitened" is nothing else than becoming a participant in whiteness and becoming white, likewise "to be heated" becoming a participant in heat and becoming hot, in the same way 1 therefore think that "to be united" is nothing else than becoming a participant in unity and becoming one. And Holy Scripture has not tired of saying that "the Word became flesh" (John 1.14), because "he was incarnate". None the less it is acknowledged by those who strive to be devout that "the Word was incarnate" is not to be understood in the same way as one might say that a body became white or hot. For as far as becoming hot or white is concerned, it is proper to a substance in itself to admit of predicates of this sort and to be altered by them. But the Logos' being incarnate does not mean anything else than his being united to flesh and a single living being resulting from two, in the sense which we have previously laid down, and not that the divine substance received the likeness of the flesh in itself and became a body, so to say. Therefore, since what is united to something becomes one with it, and we say "becoming incarnate" for "becoming one", I think it fitting to use two terms, "being united" and "becoming flesh". And I think that Holy Scripture refuted the opinion of heretics very clearly beforehand by using the expression "Incarnation" rather "union", as "union" is by custom predicated homonymously of things which are united in mere affection. This is not unusual for Scripture too, such as in the saying: "As I and you are one, so also they may be one in us" (John 17:21). For this reason it says "the Word became flesh", so that none of those who entertain fancies about the power of the divine substance may use this phrase as an evil device and suppose that a union has been effected only by mere affection, while the natures themselves remain particular and separate, and negate these words, as if they were idle. For how can the term "Incarnation", to which change and alteration pertain, allow our intellect to slip into a division of the substances which have been united?

If therefore, as I have said, from the union of the two natures a single entity has resulted, what then is this single entity? Only a mere name or a reality? If it is only a mere name, without a reality, there will be no natures that are united, just as the hound of Orion and a terrestrial dog, being one only in mere name, are not united by nature either, or a real man and a pictured man. Therefore if the natures qua being have been united, and for this reason a single entity has resulted from their union, it is, then, not a mere name, but a reality. But if it is a reality, it is one of two things: either a nature, or some of the accidents belonging with a substance. If, then, this single entity is an accident or merely some relationship of natures and not a nature, if it is, as we have said before, an operation or an honor or a power: again it is not the natures which have been united qua being, but their accidents, as it is possible to hear from the partisans of Nestorius: "In as much as the man who is from Mary has participated in the honor of the Logos, for this reason one name belongs to the two". But our argument is not now directed against it, to engage in refutations of their tenets. Therefore, if the natures have been united qua their being, and for this reason the single entity which has been effected out of their union is neither a mere name nor some accident nor an accompaniment of a nature, it must necessarily be a substance or nature. But if the single entity which has been effected out of the union of the two is a nature, then we do well to profess that there is one nature of Our Lord Christ after the union, even though we recognize it not as a simple but as a composite, as I have often said.

But if they say we ought to call him who has been effected out of the union of the two natures not one nature but one Christ, we shall pose the following dilemma before them: this name "Christ" which is predicated of the divine Logos who became incarnate, for the name "Christ" is by custom predicated homonymously of prophets and kings is it indicative of substance or of something accompanying their substance? If it is indicative of accompaniments of a substance of something, such as an operation or a power, this will also be the single end product resulting from the union. To say this is absurd, as the preceding argument has already shown by way of refutation. It would have occurred in such a way that we could not say that natures had been united, but what pertains to them accidentally and extrinsically. It is agreed, however, and professed that there is a union of the natures themselves. Thus, therefore, the name "Christ" is not indicative of accompaniments of a substance of something, if the end-product resulting from the union is Christ. But if the name "Christ" is indicative of a nature, it is one of two things: it is indicative of one nature or of two. If one, I have what is sought, namely a truly composite, and not a simple. But if two, there are the alternatives: it is indicative of each of them separately, or of both together. If of each of them separately, so that Christ will be the divine and again the human, will be predicated homonymously of both of them, like "dog of the sea" and "dog of the dry land", or univocally, in the same way that the word "man" of Peter and Paul? But if

homonymously, there will be two Christs and not one, which participate in the name, but are different in the natures understood by the name. For this is homonymy, in the same way that "dog of the sea" and "dog of the dry land" are two dogs, in that "one" belongs only in name and not in reality to what is understood by the name. But if univocally, as in the word "man" of Peter and of Paul, for whom not only the name, but also the nature understood by the name is the same, even so there will again be two Christs, just as Peter and Paul are two men; they are the same in species, but numerically two and not one. Hence, if there are not numerically two Christs, but truly one, i.e. in name and in reality, then the name "Christ" is not indicative of two natures which are understood each on its own, as Nestorius would like to have it.

But neither can be indicative of the two together. For if there is no single entity which is the end-product of the union of the two natures, the single name "man"' cannot be predicated of soul and body, nor can the name "Christ" be predicated of the two, the divinity and the humanity of Christ  since no single entity has resulted from them. For neither is the name "house" predicated of stones and of pieces of wood together, before a single form and likeness of a house has been effected as a result of their composition. Nor is the name "chorus" predicated without qualification of a plurality together, but is indicative of the relationship between all the singers, that it is one. For a single name too cannot be predicated of a plurality together, without being predicated of them homonymously or univocally, unless one nature results from their composition, or some kind of mutual affection, of which the name will be indicative. But here too they say that the name "Christ" is indicative of the end-product of the two natures. They should then say what this end-product of the divine nature and the human nature is. For again this will necessarily be either a mere name or a reality. And if it is a reality, it is either a substance or some accident accompanying a substance. Again it is in denial of its being a mere name or an extrinsic accompaniment of substance, because of the absurdities which are attendant on such opinions, that it follows that there will be one substance or composite nature known by the name "Christ". And thus Christ, being numerically one will be one nature, to be known by that name, but evidently composite and not simple, in the way that the word "man" is indicative of the nature composed of soul and body.

Having already encountered the statement that one hypostasis has resulted from two, but not, consequently, one nature as well, we shall examine it, showing its impossibility and inconsistency. For I am not oblivious to the fact that some doctors said that the name "Christ" is not indicative of a substance, but of something effected in relation to a substance, deriving this meaning of the name from ancient uses of the title "anointed". But though these names are mostly not indicative of substance but of some operation or branch of knowledge or possessions or something else of the kind, as e.g. "king", "philosopher", "grammarian", "lord", or "servant", none the less we do not often indicate by such names the kinds of things accompanying a substance. For when we say that a king has come, even though we are not saying a word indicative of a substance, none the less we are saying that the substance of the king has come. In the same manner, when we say that a grammarian walks or is sick or sleeps, we do not say that a branch of knowledge of some kind suffers for this would indeed be ridiculous but by this we mean the nature of the man who is referred to by its academic discipline, that is grammar. Thus, then, when Peter said: "You are the Christ, the Son of the living God" (Matthew 16:16), what else did he mean by the name "Christ" but him who is by nature the Son of God? Therefore, though the name "Christ" was not in the first place indicative of substance, when we say that one Christ is the end-product of two natures, his divinity and his humanity, it is evident that we are not saying that some operation is the end-product of substances in composition. For it would show great ignorance to say that an operation is the end-product of substances in composition, or, without qualification, something accidental to a substance. But in designating a composite nature truly, through the economy effected in him, as he whose name designates him as anointed, we do not depart from the fitting. This is our first chapter.

Second chapter: If there are two natures of Christ which have been united which is the same as saying "substances", for evidently the divine and the human, to which they also apply the name "dyad of natures", are substances. Is Christ other than his natures, or is he the same as his natures? If, then, Christ is other than his natures, who is he, being other than them? But nothing which exists is other than its nature. For if the nature of man is rational and mortal living being for the definitions of things are indicative of their substance but man is other than his own substance, then man will be other than rational and mortal living being. But man is nothing else than rational and mortal living being. And how should man thus be other than himself? Therefore, if Christ too were other than his own natures, but the existence of an individual is according to his nature, as we have shown Christ will then be other than himself, which is both absurd and ridiculous. Thus Christ is not other than his natures. But if he is not other, then saying "Christ" is the same as saying "his natures", because they who claim the contrary say that the name "Christ" is indicative of his two natures. Now if Christ is the same as his natures, just as man is the same as the nature of man, that is, rational mortal living being, and there are two natures of Christ and not one, then there will also be two Christs, as Nestorius thinks, and not one according to the Scriptures. If, then, Christ is truly one in name and in reality and one cannot speak in any way at all of "two Christs" in regard to the Lord's Incarnation, and if Christ is the same as his nature, as in the case of each existent, evidently there will of necessity be one nature of Christ, just as saying "the sun" is the same as saying "the nature of the sun".

The sun, indeed, being one, the nature of the sun must also be one and not two. For, if multiple differences of natural faculties are seen in the sun, such as e.g. its brightness and heat and again its three-dimensional extension and spherical shape, its circular motion and whatever else of the kind, even then there is no need to say that there are multiple natures of the sun. For nothing of the kind by itself makes the nature of the sun. Brightness is also in fire, and spherical shape in many others, and again circular motion in the whole sky and three-dimensional extension in each body, but the sun is none of those. But what is a joint product of all that has been mentioned, being one and not more, this is the sun's nature, which is not to be seen in anything else and makes the one sun and its one nature. Likewise then also in the case of the God-man, Christ: though the differences between divinity and humanity are to be seen in him, no sort of competent judge of the nature of things will be content to affirm his two natures for Christ is neither of these singly, neither his divinity, I mean, nor his humanity. But the fact that he is a joint product of the two, evidently being one and not two, and that he is not to be seen in any other existent, leads us necessarily to confess the one Christ and his single nature, though indeed composite, as we have often said.

Third chapter: If the name "Christ", while we say that it is predicated of our Savior, is indicative neither of the divinity alone nor of the humanity alone, but of the end-product of the two, it is one of two things: it is indicative of a substance or of accidents accompanying the substance of something. If it is indicative of accidents accompanying the substance of something, what is this other than a mutual relationship of natures? If therefore the name "Christ" is not indicative of a substance, but of that which is related to the substance of something, it is indicative of the end-product of the union of the two natures, i.e. nothing else but a mutual relationship of the natures. And if the two natures have remained even though they are united, then the mutual union of the natures came about only by a mere relationship, as in the case of a chorus, a house, a city and the like for those in a chorus are said to have been mutually united, as well as the stones and pieces of wood, of which a house is built. But their mutual union is only by a mere relationship, while evidently the natures themselves are separate. The name "chorus", too, is indicative of this single mutual relationship of the singers, every singer being particular and individual in his hypostasis qua his nature and hypostasis. Therefore their number has remained the same, as it was prior to their relationship of union. Likewise of a house there is one relationship of pieces of wood and stones, and on account of it even the very name "house" is used, but each one of them has its own being particularly and hypostatically in relation to the rest. Only a fitting together and juxtaposition of pieces of wood or stone happened, and they are said to be united in this respect and not in the intelligible content of their natures. This is likewise in similar cases. Therefore, if we confess that the union of natures in Christ came about not only by a mere relationship, but qua natures, as in the union of soul with body, it is not therefore possible, if the name "Christ" is indicative of him who is from the two, that it should be indicative of any accidents accompanying a substance, lest, by supposing a union only by relationship, we should separate the natures themselves. But if it is not indicative of accidents accompanying a substance, it must be indicative of a substance for there is nothing between a substance and accompanying to a substance.

Every name predicated of a plurality must be either homonymous or univocal. But if it is univocal, it is indicative of one and the same nature comprehending all those of which it is predicated, as e.g. "horse" is predicated of the horses Xanthos and Balios, and "living being" of a man and a horse for the nature of a horse is one, even if it is in many individuals, likewise, of a living being is one; even if it is in many species. For living being is animate and sensitive substance, in which commonly and to the same degree all living beings participate. But if the name is homonymous, e.g. when "horse" is predicated of a sea horse and a land horse, then "horse" is homonymous and not univocal. But as for these homonyms, when anything under an homonymy is known to be particular, and its intelligible content, being separate, isolates it from the rest of these and, no less even each singly too, qua each it signifies, from those, it is indicative of a single nature. I shall clarify what I mean with the help of examples. We have said that the name "horse" is homonymous when predicated of a land horse and a sea horse. For they participate only in name, but are separate through otherness of the substances. So, whenever speech selects the word "horse" which has many meanings, the rider too saying "I shall mean nothing by the word 'horse' except the land horse", since everybody understands that the title indicates a land horse, it is indicative of one, and only one, nature. Thus too a term applied only to a sea animal, but on the other hand indicative of a sea horse, is indicative only of a single nature. This is also the case with univocal names. The name "man" is not indicative of the individuals under the species, such as Peter and Paul and the rest, but of the species itself, just as "living being" of the genus and not of the species that are under the genus, such as horse, ox and the rest. But since each of those under the same appellation is often called by the common name, e.g. when we say "Paul", meaning a "man", the name "man" is also indicative of one individual nature. Otherwise how can we say that there are many or few men are in a city, unless the name "man" is here indicative of one individual only? For it is a single man who is signified by the species, and not many. So, the discussion has shown that any name predicated of any single subject is indicative of only one nature. So with the name "Christ", too: though predicated homonymously of our Savior and of the prophets or priests of old, none the less, when we select his predicates and accept only what applies to our Savior, which is indicative of the perfect resultant of divinity and humanity, since it cannot be indicative of the accidents accompanying any substances, as the previous discussion has proved by refutation, it is necessarily indicative of a single nature, just as any name is, whether homonymous or univocal, as we have discussed above. Therefore if we have acknowledged that the name "Christ" is not indicative of anything else but the perfect resultant of the union of divinity and humanity, and again the discussion has shown that the name "Christ" is indicative of one nature, since this is also the case with every single name, the perfect resultant of the union of divine and human nature will necessarily be one nature, as we have also shown.

Fourth chapter: If a dyad is indicative of a first distinction of a monad, in as much as it is a division, hence it has its name and division is opposed to unity, it is therefore impossible that the same should be in the same respect simultaneously united and divided; therefore no dyad qua dyad may in this respect be said to be united, but rather to be divided. I have added "qua dyad", since Paul and Peter, by being two, are in this respect divided and two, but not united. In another respect, indeed, they may be said to be united and one, I mean in the common intelligible content of nature for each of them is a rational and mortal living being, and so in this respect they are said to be united and one, in species. But insofar as this one is Peter and that one is Paul - for these are the proper names of the individuals under the species - in this respect they are two and not one, divided that is to say and not united. For the common and universal intelligible content of human nature, albeit it is in itself one, but when realized in many subjects, becomes many, existing in each completely and partially, as the intelligible content of a ship in a ship-builder, being one, becomes many, when it is realized in many subjects. Thus also the doctrine in a teacher, being one in its own intelligible content, when it is realized in those who are taught, is multiplied in them, by becoming inherent as a whole in each one. Moreover, the pattern on a ring, being one, when it is realized as a whole in each of many impressions, both is, then, and may be said to be many, so that the many ships and the many men and the many impressions and the doctrines in the many pupils qua individuals are numerically many; and in this respect they are divided and not united, qua common species, however, the many men are one, and the many ships are one, and the doctrines likewise, and the impressions by the sameness of the pattern are one. Hence in one respect they are many and divided, in another respect united and one. But though we often apply number to what is continuous, by saying e.g. that a plank is of two cubits, none the less we say that the one is two potentially, not actually, since in actuality it is one and not two: i.e. it is capable of undergoing a cut and becoming two: on this account we say that it is two things.

This being so, if there are two natures of Christ and not one, and every dyad, qua dyad, by being severable, is therein divided and not united, the two natures of Christ then also, qua natures, will be two and not one, in this divided and not united. Perhaps they would be even more divided than divided individuals who belong to the same species, such as Paul and Peter. For these, though divided numerically, are none the less united in the common species, i.e. in the intelligible content of human nature, and again additionally in the common genus, I mean in the nature of animate being. Divine and human nature, however, unless they have come to a unity of composite nature, would be divided in every respect, the duality not having been removed by composition; nor would they be united either in common genus or species. For the divine nature in its being transcends all that has been brought into existence by it, even if we often use our various names for it, when we call it "nature" and "substance". If, therefore, we have professed that what Christ results from have been united indivisibly and that the natures themselves have been united  and this is not understood as being effected qua some accidents which inhere in them  then it is impossible to say that what is indivisibly united are two, since a dyad is a split undergone in a previous division from the monad.

So since division is fuller than duality and of that of which the fullness cannot be predicated, a fortiori a part cannot be predicated for of that of which "color" is not predicated, "white" is not predicated either, and what is not an animal, a fortiori is not a man either  then if a division of natures is not predicated of Christ, a fortiori a duality of natures is not predicated of him either. If Christ's natures are not two, a fortiori they are not many, but if they are neither two nor many, and everything is either one or two or many, we should necessarily affirm that there is one nature of Christ, composed of divinity and humanity. For though many faculties, i.e. predicates, are said to be in one and the same, as e.g. in fire there is heat, brightness, redness, lightness and the like, none the less all of them are united, by being in one and the same subject. And what is remarkable about their being in the entire subject, if the many are one? For even the parts of our body, though being many in the totality composed of all of them, when united, have effected the single whole. And how can they then not deem the united natures of Christ to come together into one nature? If the two have not become one by virtue of a principle of union, as the many parts of the body which have effected a single totality, nor indeed have come to be in one and the same subject, which is other than they, as even in the body of fire the faculties that constitute it, nor is there any source then of their union, then they are always divided. For if they say that one Christ has been effected out of them, we have already said ourselves what answer we should give to that. Hence it has been shown by what has been said that those who confess an undivided union of natures must profess that one composite nature has been effected out of the union of the two natures, because the individual which is composed of them is one, the one whom they also call Christ.

Fifth chapter: If Christ, composed of divinity and humanity, is one and not two, then there will also be one composite nature of the compound, as there is also one composite nature of man, who is composed of soul and body. If, however, there is not one composite nature of the compound but two, they must be either simple or composite. But if they are simple, since a compound also results from two simple, then there are two simple from two simple. The syllogism is as follows: Everything which results from two simple is composite, and every compound is at least of two simple. Hence everything which results from two simple natures is two simple natures, which is absurd and also senseless. Or like this : a compound is of two natures, and each of the two natures is after the act of composition simple and not composite. Thus the compound even after the act of composition is simple and not composite. This would be so, if the two natures of the compound are simple. If, on the other hand, are composite, it will arise that from two simple two composite ones have come into being. The syllogism is as follows: Everything which is from two simple is composite, but every compound is less than two composite natures. Therefore two composite natures would result from two simple natures, which is impossible for every compound is less in number than the simple. For this reason one cannot say that there are two natures of a compound, be they simple or composite, nor, however, one simple one. It remains that there must be one composite nature of the compound.

Sixth chapter: If Christ is one in name and reality for there are not two Christs  if someone wants to define him, or simply give the intelligible content of what he is, he must on all accounts give a single formula for the single one, i.e. a single in signification, even if the wording is different, while indicating one and the same. For every definition of nature is indicative of the subject reality, and therefore the definition of Christ, or the formula of what he is, is indicative of his nature. But every definition by being one unless it is homonymous is indicative of one nature. Thus also the definition of Christ, or the formula indicative of what he is, will be indicative of his single nature. And conversely: if there are two natures of Christ, and the two natures have two definitions which do not indicate the same, Christ, though being one, will then have two definitions which do not indicate the same. But if this is impossible, since of everything by being one there will be one definition, then Christ will not have two definitions. But if this is not the case there will neither be his two natures for every definition is indicative of a single nature, either simple or composite.

Seventh chapter: Let the seventh discourse use the suppositions of our opponents to put a seal on the truth. For though they suppose that there are two natures of Christ, they claim that there is only one hypostasis of him, and in like manner they reject those who call Christ "one nature" after the union, and those who hold that there are two hypostases of him. But before we cast ourselves into the refutations of this supposition, I consider it right to distinguish first what the teaching of the Church intends to mean with "nature", and with "hypostasis" and "prosopon". Thus it holds that nature is the intelligible content of being common to participants in the same substance, as every man is a rational and mortal living being, capable of reason and understanding; for in this respect no one single man is distinguished from another. Substance and nature amount to the same. Hypostasis, however, or prosopon, is indicative of the concrete individual existence of each nature and, so to speak, a circumscription compounded of certain properties, whereby the participants in the same nature differ, and, to say it in brief, those which the Peripatetics usually call individuals, in which the division into genera and species comes to an end. The doctors of the Church name them hypostases, sometimes also prosopa. Living being is divided into rational and irrational, and again the rational is divided into man, angel and demon into which each of these last species are then divided, such as man into Peter and Paul, angel into, say, Gabriel and Michael and each of the remaining angels, "individuals", because they do not think that any of them after being divided into other entities preserves its nature after the division. For the division of a man into soul and body effects the destruction of the whole living being. For this reason, they usually call them individuals. The ecclesiastical terminology, however, has named them hypostases, because in them genera and species assume existence. For though living being, say, and man have their own intelligible content of being, one of them being the genus, the other being the species, yet they have existence in the individuals, such as in Peter and in Paul, outside which they do not subsist.

We have said what hypostasis is and what nature is according to the ecclesiastical rule. Hence the same common name, such as that of man, by which no man is distinguished from another, when it exists in each individual, is then proper to this one and not common to anyone else, as we have laid down in the fourth chapter. For the rational and mortal living being in me is not common to anyone else. For instance, when a certain man suffers, or an ox or a horse, it is possible for individuals of the same species to remain without suffering. When Paul dies, it is possible that no other man dies with him. And when Peter came into being and arrived at existence, the men who were to come after him did not yet exist. Therefore each nature is called, what it is, not in a single, but in a twofold manner: in one way, when we look at the common intelligible content of each nature on its own, such as the nature of man or of horse which does not exist in any of the individuals; in another way, when we look at the same common nature which exists in the individuals and assumes a particular existence in each of them, and does not fit with anything else except with this alone. For the rational and mortal living being in me is not common to any other man. And the nature of living being which is in this horse is not in any other, as we have now shown.

That the teaching of the Church has such conceptions regarding nature and hypostasis is evident from the fact that we confess one nature of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, but we teach as doctrine three hypostases of them, each of which is distinguished from the others by a certain property. For what should the one nature of the divinity be if not the common intelligible content of the divine nature seen on its own and separated in the conception of the property of each hypostasis? But because we understand the term "nature" more particularly, we see that the common intelligible content of nature becomes proper to each individual and then cannot fit with any other of those under the same species. And again this is evident from the fact that in Christ we hold a union of two natures, the divine, and the human for we do not say that the common nature of the divinity which is viewed in the Holy Trinity has become incarnate. If this were the case, we would predicate the Incarnation also of the Father and of the Holy Spirit. But we do not hold that the common intelligible content of human nature has been united with God the Logos; for in that case it could be rightly said that God the Logos was united with all men who were before the advent of the Logos and who were to come after it. But it is evident that here we speak of the nature of the divinity as that nature which is particularized in the hypostasis of the Logos from the common divinity. Therefore we also confess the one incarnate nature of God the Logos and by adding "of God the Logos" to it, we clearly distinguish it from the Father or the Holy Spirit. So, here too having conceived of the common intelligible content of the divine nature as being proper to God the Logos, we then say that the nature of the Logos has become incarnate. On the other hand, we say that the nature of the humanity has been united to the Logos as that particular existence which alone out of all the Logos has assumed. So that in this meaning of "nature", "hypostasis" and "nature" are, as it were, the same, except that the term "hypostasis" in addition also signifies those properties which, apart from the common nature, belong to each of the individuals, and by which they are separated from each other.

Hence one can find many of our party who say indiscriminately that a union of hypostases or natures has been accomplished for since hypostasis denotes the existence which is proper to each individual and they often use these terms indifferently, it is evident that they want to denote for us by these terms the proper nature. Because even in familiar discourse and according to the usage of natural scientists it is customary for all to call the common intelligible content of nature "man", since none of the individuals either is a species under a genus or is predicated as such. But we also say that man is different from horse, obviously speaking of these as universal natures. On the other hand, we say that Peter is a man, and that a man exists and dies, evidently an individual, and likewise when the nature of man has the common intelligible content.

Furthermore, we ought to provide the following preliminary qualification: the terms "prosopon" and "hypostasis" often indicate the same meaning to us, as if one called the same thing "blade" and "sword". Likewise indeed of the Holy Trinity we speak indiscriminately of three prosopa and three hypostases, in an undifferentiated manner meaning the same by both terms. Often, however, we distinguish prosopon from hypostasis, when we call a mutual relationship "prosopon". Customary usage is not unaware of this meaning of "prosopon" either. For we say that somebody has taken on my part and that someone states his case to someone, and we say that the governor represents the king. Hence those who are attentive to the doctrines of Nestorius are not inclined to attribute to Christ either a single hypostasis or a single nature, because they do not maintain a union either of natures or hypostases per se. Rather, they suppose that the one from Mary is a mere man who contains in himself complete divine illumination and is thereby distinguished from all the other Godclad men, by the fact that in each of them the divine illumination was partial. Therefore they boldly claim that the prosopon of Christ is one, naming the relationship of God the Logos with the man from Mary, which is one, "one prosopon", because that carried out the complete divine economy in the prosopon of the divinity of the Logos. Hence, the insult done to the man will rightly refer to God, as also the honor and the insult done by the subjects to the governor will refer to the king himself. They say then that the name "Christ", in the proper sense, is indicative of this relationship, and for this reason they claim to speak of one Christ, since the relationship is one, even if those who participate in it are many. Therefore I believe it is evident to those who think reverently about the Incarnation of our Savior that, when we ourselves say that there is one prosopon of Christ, we do not, as it seemed fitting to the friends of Nestorius, introduce the term "prosopon" for the mere relationship of God with a man. No, we use the terms "hypostasis" and "prosopon" indifferently and thus say that there is one prosopon of Christ, just as there is one hypostasis of a man, e.g. Peter or Paul.

In addition to these other things we should discuss first the following point: though there was not even an ever so short moment when the humanity of Christ subsisted apart from its union with the Logos, but from the beginning of its being it assumed union with the Logos, nonetheless we do not say that this nature is without a hypostasis, since it had a subsistence of its own apart from other men and a circumscribed existence of its own distinct from the common nature of all other men by certain properties. For we have just shown that the term "hypostasis" means that. Therefore, as we profess in respect to the divinity of Christ both its nature and hypostasis, likewise in respect to his humanity we must profess, in the same manner as the nature, its proper hypostasis also, so as not to be compelled to profess this nature without a hypostasis. For evidently the humanity of our Savior existed as one of the individuals under the common nature.

Now that this has been explained clearly and agreed by all, I think, those who suppose that there are two natures of Christ, but one hypostasis since indeed each of the united must have had both a nature and a hypostasis, it should tell us one of two things : whether they confess that the union of natures and hypostases was accomplished to the same degree, or whether they think that the hypostases were more united, since one hypostasis resulted from the two, but the natures less so, since two remained after the union? If someone should suppose the second: first, it appears irrational and impossible for them to attribute intension and remission to a union of natures, when substance does not at all admit of more or less. For why and how can they have a more or less in that union, as e.g. in the case of white and black which admit of intension and remission, and of more and less, and are capable of being united by mixing? Hence, as for quantity and especially finite quantity, such as two or three, which do not admit of intension and remission, and whose union does not admit of intension and remission even if they are united with each other, five, made up by the addition of three and two, are not more or less. Thus by logical consequence, if substances do not admit of increase and decrease, they cannot be united more and less either. However, if someone should say that what have been united not only as individuals, but also in genera or species are more united, as two individuals under the same species may be united, for example two drops of water or two pieces of wood, of which someone will say that they are united more, namely more than the elements in a compounded body  for those are different in species  and again than soul and body  for those are different in genus : well, here we do not speak about things which are said to be united or divided with respect to another thing, but qua themselves. For Peter and Paul, divided qua themselves, are united with respect to another thing, I mean in genus and in species. Mixed elements, united qua themselves in the composition, are divided with respect to another thing, namely qua species, because they are different in species. Likewise also soul and body are united qua themselves in a living being, but divided qua species and genus. Thus all substances which are said to be united qua themselves en ipso do not have increase or decrease, as we have shown. For neither do they bring about the union by something else accompanying them, but by being natures. Secondly, since the hypostasis, along with its accompanying properties, is the same as the more particular nature of individuals, if we assert that it is the same and that there is a union of the particular natures of the individuals, then one cannot say that the natures have been united less and the hypostases more. Bui let us abandon this matter, since it has no basis, because its absurdity is evident. If one cannot say that the natures have been united less and the hypostases more, then we must confess a union of natures and of hypostases to the same degree. But if the union regarding both of them is to the same degree, what is the reason that we should assert of the hypostases that one has emerged as a result of the union, but that the two natures have remained two even after the union? Hence they must either speak of one nature or say that, along with the two natures, there are also two hypostases, to be consistent with themselves, accepting the union or the division entirely.

But what is their sophism? "By saying one hypostasis we preserve the union and by two natures, the unconfusedness of the united elements". Let us then say in response to them: it is not the case that an equal union of the two and the unconfusedness of the united elements have been preserved alike. For the natures themselves will not have remained without confusion, and the hypostases of the natures will also have been confused. However, even after the union the properties of the hypostasis of God the Logos, by which he is separated from the Father and the Holy Spirit, are preserved. His properties have not been confused with the properties of the human nature which has been united to him, by which he is separated from the rest of men. If it is therefore ill-considered of us to assert that the hypostases have become one because of the union without shrinking from their confusion, and to say that the two natures have remained after the union because of fear of confusion, what would prevent them, by reversing the argument, from professing one nature because of the union, but two hypostases because of their unconfusedness? Though the point is indeed partly false, none the less this argument is more plausible than the other. That one nature can generate many hypostases is evident to everyone. Thus we profess one nature of the Godhead and assert that there are three hypostases of it. In the case of men, there is one nature of the hypostases under it extending in almost infinite plurality and similarly with the rest of things. It is impossible, however, that two natures which preserve their numerical duality should make up one hypostasis. This can be proved not only by induction from all the particular instances for how could there be of stone and wood one hypostasis, i.e. one individual, or of ox and horse, or of God and man from the working of reason itself? For if in the hypostases which is the same as to say in the individuals each nature assumes existence, given that there are two natures, there must be at least two hypostases in which the natures have assumed existence for a nature cannot subsist on its own, without being seen in an individual, and we have just shown that individual and hypostasis are the same. Therefore those who say that not only one hypostasis, but also one nature has resulted because of the union are seen to be consistent with themselves and with the truth; those, however, who say that there is one hypostasis, but two natures have been seen to be inconsistent with themselves and with the truth.

But they say: "Because the humanity of Christ acquired subsistence in the Logos and did not presubsist its union with the Logos, we therefore say that there is one hypostasis of Christ". Let us ask, then, one of two things: whether nature and hypostasis mean one and the same thing, as if it only was a difference of terms which coincide in one meaning, such as "blade" and "sword", or whether different things. Now if the same, given that there is one hypostasis, there must also be one nature, as likewise, if there is one blade, there must also be one sword; or, if there are two natures, there must also be two hypostases. If, however, the term "nature" means one thing and the term "hypostasis" another and the reason for their holding that there is one hypostasis of Christ is the fact that the hypostasis of the man did not preexist prior to its union with the Logos, then the reason for there being two natures of Christ will be the fact that the nature of the man did preexist its union with the Logos. But if the particular nature united to the Logos presubsisted, its hypostasis must also have presubsisted. As far as these things are concerned, it is not possible that one of them should be the case, while the remaining one is not; I mean the particular nature without its own hypostasis, or the particular hypostasis without its own nature. For the basic of both is one and are often used concurrently, as we have shown a little earlier. If, therefore, the hypostasis, like the nature united to the Logos, did not presubsist the union with him, for the very reason they assert one hypostasis of Christ, they should also assert that his nature is one; for since they are not different qua united with each other, they will not be different in that respect either.

Eighth chapter: If they say that because of their unconfusedness there are two natures of Christ after the union, namely the divine and the human, they should not say that there are two but three, that of the body, that of the soul and that of the divinity. For the natures of the soul and the body also remained without confusion. What kind of reasoning is this, then, for them to acknowledge man, made up of soul and body, as one nature after the union, yet deny that Christ, constituted of divinity and humanity, is one nature after the union, notwithstanding the fact that the union of divinity and humanity is recognized as no whit inferior but rather as superior to that of soul and body? For just as those from which Christ is united have remained without confusion, so too have those from which man is. If, therefore, man, who is from soul and body, is one nature, Christ, who is from divinity and humanity, must also be one nature for Christ is nothing else but he who is from the two, just as man, who is from soul and body. We shall explain the phrase "unconfused union" as we proceed with our treatise. Therefore, they should either say that there are three natures of Christ because of body and soul and divinity, or that the three have become one because of the union. By affirming two natures and not three, they are en ipso bound to say that there is only one and not two.

But what else do they bring up besides this? Something insipid and insane: "We do not say that there are three natures of Christ, but two, the created one and the uncreated one. For soul and body are alike created. Hence qua being created, soul and body are one nature; the divine nature, however, is uncreated. Therefore one should speak of two natures of Christ, the created one and the uncreated one, and not of three". Now these people are very ignorant regarding the principles by which sameness and otherness in things is correctly predicated. If we use this argument, what prevents us from reaching the opposite conclusion? For if every nature, qua nature and substance, is not different in any way, as an animal from an animal qua being animal, and therefore each receives the name and definition of substance, as every animal that of "animal" then every substance qua is a single item, as creatures, qua being created, are called one nature. If this is so, and substance and nature are called created and uncreated, and qua this are not different from one another, then there is one nature of Christ, and their objection will have been thus reversed; but in this way all creatures, e.g. angel and gnat, will be one nature. But I hold it to be evident to everyone that, when we investigate certain things of the same nature and of different substance, it is not right to predicate sameness or difference of their natures according to some accident belonging to the substances externally, but rather according to what belongs to them substantially and constitutes their being. If this were not so, we would say that natures which differ much were one nature, and, on the other hand, those which participate in the same substance would be placed along with those that are other in substance. For example, when we investigate whether, say, a horse and a man are the same in substance, it is not right to consider whether both of them are white, or walk, or are created. For thus we make into one substance those which in their totalities are separate in natures. But neither do we say of the Scythian and the Ethiopian that they are other in substance, because they are very different from each other by blackness and whiteness, or by a long nose or a flat nose, or by the state of being servant and being master, or by obtaining authority over one who is under authority. The reason for this is that these properties are not what are considered constitutive of substance, nor do they form the nature of each subject. Rather, "rational" and "irrational" - which is substantially the difference between man and horse - should be taken according to this principle of substances man is considered separate from horse, but hence not the Scythian from the Ethiopian, for both of them are rational and mortal. If, therefore, "created" and "uncreated" are not indicative of substances, but of that which is recognized as belonging to substance, then they should not say that soul and body are one nature because both of them are created, but they are reckoned to be entirely other in genus and do not fall under the intelligible content of nature altogether, insofar as they are such, since the one is a body, the other incorporeal.

But even if "created" and "uncreated" were constitutive of the underlying natures, it would not be an act of wisdom to adjudge their consubstantiality from the common belonging to things. For in all joint participants one sees sameness and otherness, and what each is, is not by sameness of genus, but by their very own differences, by means of which each is separated from the rest under the same genus. A horse and an ox and a man are likewise an animal, and in this respect are not at all different from one another. However, they are not for this reason from the same substance, but the differences applicable to the common genus, such as "rational" and "irrational", have constituted a different nature, and so "irrational", having introduced a natural difference, separates a horse from an ox, even though it is difficult to name the difference. For if consubstantiality should be adjudged according to the common features, then it would turn out that sky and earth would be consubstantial, for both of them are body, and fire and water, man and stone and again soul and body would be consubstantial, for they are substances, not to mention that God too would be consubstantial with the universe, insofar as we usually call the divinity a substance, too, even though the divinity transcends everything that exists. So, since they are non-consubstantial, even though they participate in the common genera, soul and body should not, owing to the differences in the common genus, be called one nature, even though, qua creatures, soul and body have substantial being, in the same way that horse and ox are an animal qua common genus.

Ninth chapter: "Divided" and "divisible" do not mean the same, nor do "undivided" and "indivisible". For "divided" means what has already undergone parting in actuality, whereas "divisible" means what has not yet been parted, but can undergo parting in actuality. On the other hand, "undivided" means only what has not yet been divided into parts, whereas "indivisible" means what cannot be divided. The opposite of "divided" is "undivided", of "divisible" is "indivisible”. If, therefore, we profess in common an indivisible union, and the indivisible cannot be divided, for whatever reason this is not possible, then the union, i.e. the end-product of the union cannot be divided. If this is so, and duality, as we have shown in the fourth chapter, is nothing else than a parting and a first division of the monad, then the end-product of the union cannot receive the reality or the name of duality. The end-product of the union, however, is Christ. For this reason, if the union is preserved, we cannot call Christ "two natures", unless someone understands by the word a difference between the united.

Tenth chapter: The tenth discourse will solve the controversial points issuing from our opponents. For it is evident to everyone, as I think, that refutations of opponents' arguments are proofs of the opposite. They say: "If Christ is consubstantial with the Father qua divinity and consubstantial with us qua humanity, then there are two natures of Christ and not one. For how would one be consubstantial with those that are different in substance?" However, we do not hold that the one nature of Christ is simple for a simple and single entity cannot be at once consubstantial with two entities that are different in substance. Hence if we say that the nature of Christ is composite, composed of divinity and humanity, what inconceivability or absurdity appears in our reasoning, if we say that the single Christ, being a single individual and a single hypostasis, is qua the one and the other consubstantial with the one and the other? Because we also say that the single nature of man, by being composed of soul and body, is consubstantial with bodies and with incorporeals, qua the common natures of body and of incorporeality, but we do not make two natures for man qua man, for neither a man's body in and of itself nor his soul, viewed in itself, makes human nature, but it is evident that we call the composite "man", even though the Apostle Paul speaks rather metaphorically of the inner man and the outer man'. We also say of water that it is consubstantial with air qua humidity and with earth qua coldness.

Evidently it admits of a partial communion with each of them, but water itself in the totality of its substance, qua water, is not two natures. Hence, though Christ is said to be consubstantial with the Father qua divinity and with us qua humanity, it is not correct to call his totality as a whole "two natures". For neither his divinity alone nor his humanity alone makes up Christ. No, the whole individual we call one nature, is in his totality consubstantial neither with the Father since God the Father is not human as we are, nor with us since we are not, by being men, gods in substance as well. Therefore he is consubstantial with the Father and with us partially, and not in the totality of the end-product, which as being one individual we say is thereby one nature. While we divide him conceptually into that from which he has been constituted, we see therein his consubstantiality with the Father and with us. Take another consideration: when we are baptized we profess to believe in one Lord Jesus Christ, Son of God; and we do not think of the one as two sons. For we are not now producing an argument against Nestorius who said that the Son by nature is from God the Father, but the one from Mary is a man and not the Son of God by nature, but in honor and in affectionate indwelling; though, more shamed by the utterances of the Holy Spirit, he pronounces the two one in honor and in prosopon.

"If, therefore, Our Lord Jesus Christ is truly one Son, how do we say that one and the same is Son of God the Father qua divinity and  again the same is son of man qua humanity? For if qua the former there exists a Son of God, and qua the latter a son of man, there must also be two sons here. For if there be one son, there are the alternatives: Son of God or son of man; but with both being affirmed, then two sons would necessarily be professed: one of God, the other of man". If, then, we confess one truly natural Son of God, believing that in one respect he is Son of God, that in another respect the same is son of man - "concerning his Son'", says the Apostle, "who was of the seed of David in flesh" (Romans 1:3)- we are not obliged by anyone for this reason to speak of two sons. For he who is from the two through composition is one. Accordingly we must affirm that he is one composite nature, though this is in one respect consubstantial with God the Father, in another respect with us. For if this is the reason for there being two natures, then it will be the same reason for there being two sons, because Christ is Son of God and son of man. But if this is the reason for there not being two sons, but one through composition, there will not be two natures here either, because the same one is consubstantial with the Father and also with us, yet again a single one because of the composition.

But they say: "If the natures have remained in the union without confusion and if the property of each of them is preserved, with neither of them suffering from any change or confusion by virtue of the union why is it not necessary that we should speak of two natures after the union?" What, then, prevents us on our part from answering the opponents' question and saying: if we acknowledge that the natures have been united qua being natures and that a union makes those that have been united one, as has been shown in the first chapter, how could there be two natures of Christ, after they have been united? For if those that are united become one, it follows necessarily that those that have not become one have not been united. If, therefore, there are two natures of Christ and not one, and a duality, being a parting, is indicative of division, and what are divided are not united, then the natures of Christ are not united. Hence if they are minded to speak of two natures of Christ because of their not being confused, none the less they will be obliged to speak of his one nature because of the union. And so an equivalent argument has emerged. What then do we say on this point, or how are we to mediate in this apparent contradiction? Because if all things which are united in a composition suffer change or variation, bringing the intelligible content of their nature to nought, as occurs in a mingling of the elements out of which our bodies have emerged, or in mixed liquids, it then follows necessarily either that the natures of which Christ exists will never be united or that, being contracted into one nature, they will not, because of the force of the union, escape from suffering variation or confusion. But what has just been said is not only completely erroneous, but also grossly ignorant, and both unscientific and nonsensical. For to contest this opinion, we can produce not just one example or two, but many, indeed an almost unlimited number, and we can refute this kind of opinion not only by examples, but also by a natural principle.

First, we shall present a proof from examples. Now the union of the soul with the body is well-known to everyone and also that man's single subsistence is constituted from these two. But the composite living being of one man is confessedly one nature with no thought of confusion in the man having occurred. If someone should call man two natures, we will tell him the same as we have said previously against those who say that Christ is two natures. For although some have said that man is principally the soul, since the rational living being is more, none the less we are now conducting a discussion about that composite living being constituted of soul and body. This example, then, which I have mentioned, is in popular use, as it were. But also illuminated air is totally mixed with  light, and is a single reality from the two, and does not admit of any division either, as long as it is in the light, but is susceptible only conceptually. This can also be said regarding water which is illuminated and any body which is radiant and shining. For glass vessels too and many stones are transparent and so admit light into them. In all respects, however, the united are preserved without confusion. For that air illuminated with light is a single entity, is evident from the fact that no part whatsoever of the illuminated air is deprived of light, the light having remained in its entire substance, and with nothing, on the other hand, of the light united with the air being separated from the substance of the air either. Therefore if there is no separation to be seen in the two natures that have been united in the union, then one illuminated air has been created from the two. For just as the humidity or the softness or the lightness of air, by remaining in the whole body, have constituted the single whole, so the light, by remaining in the whole substance, has constituted the single whole, even more so if one takes into account that the light continues without separation from it, as occurs in superlunary bodies. For they enjoy the light of the sun all the time. That united light and air have remained without confusion is evident from the fact that the natural property of each of them has persisted exactly, no whit damaged by the union. For neither has the light in its nature been obscured in any way, when joined with the air, nor, on the other hand, has the air suffered in any way in the intelligible content of its substance, qua being air, on receiving the light. Hence when the light is separated, the air persists in its own nature undisturbed. Entities which experience change or variation or confusion in a union never really undergo separation, because the intelligible content of their nature has been destroyed in the union, as with the mingling of wine and honey, or with wine mingled with water, and whatever such cases there may be. For although it is said that our body is dissolved into its constituent elements, those who are not deprived of insight into the things of nature know those are not dissolved into numerically those from which they had been, rather, there will be another generation of elements after the destruction of the body, which are not the same in number, but the same in species. Here then, the separable light has left the nature of the air or of the water or of the other bright and illuminated things undamaged. And the mixture of light with air and with other bright things has left each of them and whatever is from them, unconfused. We can say that it is the same also with glowing iron and many other things. For the brightness which is in the potentiality of air is realized by the penetration of the light and passes into the actuality of light, just as one could say that a man is capable of understanding, when he receives in actuality something belonging to instruction, and brings what is in potentiality to its completion and actuality. None the less the intelligible content of man's substance and that of air persists as what it is in the perfection which already has, insofar as anything pertaining to the substance is visible. For air is no "less" air, even when light is not present, and likewise man, even when instruction is not given in actuality; for he is a rational mortal living being; and the body of a living being too, capable of vitality which comes to it from the soul, is completed by receiving it and passing into actuality. In the intelligible content of body's substance, qua being a body, it has remained as it is. For a body which enjoys life is animated, but when it is deprived, it is inanimate. It is in no way "more" or "less" body in any of its senses. This is the way we ought to think of the holy Incarnation. For the humanity of God the Logos has been realized through the union with him, or rather, it has been deemed worthy of a supernatural reality. But in the intelligible content of man, soul and body have remained as they are, the intelligible content of their substance having in no way been changed by the effects of the union of God the Logos with soul and body. This will be the end here of examples. For they are sufficient to convince anyone who argues with us that there is no necessity at all for things united to be confused.

These are enough for argument from examples. Now only what are capable of their own dissolution when they meet at the same point also do not preserve naturally for the intelligible content of their nature the natural predicates, as when heat is mingled with coldness and white with black. Yet not all of them suffer that sort, but only those approximating to the same genus which is mutually opposed, such as whiteness and blackness which are contraries and are under one color, since color is their nearest genus. Likewise also bitterness to sweetness, for they are contraries, their genus being flavor. The same applies to cold and heat and all similar to them. For those contrary predicates can, whenever acting upon, or being acted upon by one another, duly induce mutual destruction by their intermingling, whereas all those predicates which are not contraries and do not approximate to one genus, even if they concur into one species and the generation of one nature and are mutually derived, none the less preserve their properties without confusion, with no damage by another. For example, in the generation of an apple sweetness has concurred with a certain color and spherical form and a certain scent and heaviness, the product of all which, along with the corporeality which is the subject of the mentioned predicates, has completed the single nature of the apple, and the apple as an entirety is, e.g., sweet, heavy, spherical, odoriferous and of a certain color. For none of these predicates has suffered any disturbance in its nature as a result of the mingling with one another, as if, e.g., sweetness would be disturbed by color or heaviness or shape. Neither, on the other hand, has the heaviness become less because of the color or because of the flavor, nor yet form undergone any disturbance because of the color; but each of these, though persisting in the entire substance of the apple, is none the less without disturbance by others. And for this reason those predicates which are not mutually contrary cannot by nature be disturbed by one another. So why should color or redness be disturbed by scent, or again heaviness by sweetness? For only contraries which jointly refer to one genus can be disturbed by or in one another. For each of the predicates mentioned refers jointly under its respective different genus, namely redness under color, sweetness under flavor, spherical shape under form and heaviness under weight. So, since confusion is only seen in predicates when they are united, and not in all of them, but in all referred jointly under one genus, but the remaining ones are not confused because of the otherness of genera, how can all those not be very ridiculous who either in the case of soul and body or in the case of divinity and humanity, out of fear of confusion, shrink from affirming that the product of composition is one nature? For soul and body or God and man are not contraries, they are not even predicates at all, or jointly referred to one genus: the flesh is under "body", the soul under the genus "incorporeal". If, therefore since body and soul are alien in genus, they cannot admit of change or confusion in the union, and all of us affirm that he who is from two is one nature because of the union: how is it not insanity beyond measure for those who have once admitted the said union to dissolve the union, out of fear of confusion and ascribe two natures to him who is from two? Thus they have propounded for us contradictory propositions, because they have agreed to affirm one nature for man and one hypostasis for Christ. But we have shown above that there cannot be one hypostasis in two natures.

Consider also the following argument: If the union in Christ is without confusion and here "without confusion" is the same as saying "duality of natures"  for they say that because of the unconfusedness of those that have been united two natures exist and are to be spoken of  then the "union" in Christ is indicative of a duality of natures. On the other hand, if the union is undivided, but the undivided is necessarily one and not two for we have previously shown this, too  then "union" is indicative of a single reality and not two, and therefore it is impossible that the same term should in the same respect be indicative of a single reality, and not of a single reality but two. For the union is, and is recognized as, at once unconfused and undivided. Consider it also in another way: If the united from two is two qua unconfusedness, as they say, and on the other hand the united is one qua undividedness, as has been shown, then two is one, which is impossible. If, however, undividedness is the same as the monad, but of him of whom "one" is predicated, duality is not predicated  for the same in the same respect cannot be one and two  and if "without confusion" and "without division" are predicated alike of the union, then "without confusion" does not indicate a duality of natures, so that "one" and duality will not be predicated of the same in the same respect. If, however, they persist in saying that otherwise "without confusion" will not be preserved in the union, unless we call the united "two natures", and that those united must either be confused, if qua being united they are one nature, or, if they have remained without confusion, there must be two natures of the composite: they should consider the absurdity their argument draws them into. For if "without confusion" must introduce a duality in Christ, and duality division, as we have shown, since duality is the first division of the monad, then it is impossible for any things whatever to be joined in an undivided union unless they have experienced confusion. But if the constituent of Christ have not experienced confusion, then they have not concurred in an undivided union with each other. And if, then, the constituent of Christ have concurred into an undivided union with each other, then there is no necessity, because they have persisted without confusion, for Christ to be two natures. This is the basic fact to which the said absurdities attach.

This having thus been proved, it has been asked boldly by some: "If he who is from two is one nature, which of the two has perished?" has anyhow also resolved itself. For should those who say that there is one nature from two say that it is simple and not composite, I think perhaps there would be a reason justifying the question. But as it is, there being one composite and the simples being preserved in this composite, the question is completely absurd. For if it were necessary for one of those which have come into union to perish, then the remainder would not be composite but simple. If, however, it is not simple, but composite, it will all be one in virtue of the composition. For every simple is preserved in a composition in virtue of the unconfusedness of the united entities. Neither is it correct to ask in the case of an apple which of the simples of which it is constituted has perished, if the resultant from all of them is one composite nature, nor in the case of illuminated air and all similar things. Perhaps this question is not even very useful in the case of what are united by intermingling. For in the intermingling of wine and honey the natures of the wine and of the honey are preserved together, though not without disturbance or alteration. But what shall we say also in the case of man whom we also acknowledge as one nature, neither of his constituent elements having, we are convinced, perished. Even more therefore in the case of Christ is this question an absurdity. Even if we say that this individual, while being one nature, is composed of divinity and of humanity, they will ask which of the simples has perished. For he, too, as composite is one, and each of the simples fully preserves in the composite the proper intelligible content of its nature, because it is not necessary for those thus united to be confused. For we have said what entities can be confused, when entering into union.

"But if", they say, "we acknowledge that the properties of the natures are preserved after the union and if we recognize their difference and hence that in God the properties of two or three natures appear, of the body, of the soul, and of the divinity, why then should we not in this way also acknowledge natures of Christ, when we do not negate their properties? Hence if because of the union there was one nature and hypostasis, why did there not also come to be, because of the same union, one property from these many properties? If however, the union has not contracted the plurality of properties, then it has not contracted the duality of natures either". The answer to this will be obvious to us, if we define what the term "properties" wants to indicate for us. Thus we usually call the substantial differences, i.e. the distinctive characteristics of each nature, which appear in them as belonging to them specifically, "properties of natures". For instance, to be three dimensionally extended and perceptible belongs specifically to the nature of each body. To earth belong dryness, heaviness and resistance, i.e. the encounter of one thing with another, or countercheck of one thing upon another, which belongs to it exclusively; consequently resistance can also pertain to composites. To fire, on the other hand, belong lightness, heat and along with these brightness, which is its more characteristic property. To air, then, belong humidity and brightness, but it’s more characteristic property is the capacity for conducting sound and lack of color; and to water fluidity, humidity and brightness, although they are common to it and to air. To our soul, on the other hand, belong self mastery, being capable of reason and learning. We thus call its constancy of being, its omnipotence, and its infinity in omnipotence, its immutability, its goodness and the like "properties of the divinity". Hence we usually call these and the like "properties of the nature" of each. As for nature, however, as we have said before, when introducing "substance", we do not usually call any one of the properties in something its "nature". For otherwise none, as 'it were, of those things which have their own specific being could have been one nature, there being many properties to be seen in each of them both on the level of genus and on the level of species. But the compound of all the constituents of the subject, this we call "nature and substance". For example, we say that brightness is a property of fire, but not the nature of fire; lightness is even more specifically a property of fire, but we do not say either that this is the nature of fire. Rather that which is made up of all these together, of which fire is constituted, along with the corporeality underlying them, this is the substance and nature of fire. Likewise properties of air are lack of color and the capacity for conducting sound, but very common humidity and brightness, for these are also in water, and again lightness and heat, for these are also in fire. But we say that none of these singly is the nature or substance of air, but rather that which is composed of all of them together, along with the underlying three-dimensionality. This being so, nothing rules out there being many properties in every existent, as we have shown by examples, however, there cannot be many natures or substances for there is one substance of fire, which has been made up from all those which belong to it and likewise with air and the rest. Hence just as we say that in brass, by its consisting of the four elements, is preserved earth's property, e.g. heaviness and resistance, air's capacity for conducting sound and likewise also water's fluidity, none the less we do not therefore say that there are many natures of brass but one. Just as we also say that in a glass vessel both brightness, which is a property of water and air, and heaviness and resistance, which are properties of earth, and the fluidity of water are preserved, and we say that there is one nature and substance of the glass vessel and not many; so too in our Lord Jesus Christ, consisting of divinity and humanity, the properties of the natures from which he has been constituted are preserved of the divinity and of the humanity, I mean, although they are numerically many. None the less we say that his nature as a whole is one and not many, for the reasons 1 have previously given. For who in his right mind has the audacity to say that air has many natures, or water, or fire, or anything else of that kind, because of the many natural faculties in each of them, such as in fire heat, lightness, dryness and brightness, and in air lucidity, humidity, fervor, softness, transparency and whatever else naturally belongs to each of them? The argument is the same for bodies composed of each of them. Hence we do well to say that in Christ also the properties of each of th natures from which he has been constituted are preserved, and that there is one composite nature and hypostasis of the whole.

Since some out of ignorance have the audacity to find fault even with the expression "composite", although it is clearly proclaimed about Christ by all the doctors of the Church, let us quickly resolve the doubts about it: "If the divinity is simple and not composite, but Christ is composed of divinity and humanity, then the non-composite and simple has become composite and has not remained in its own simplicity". This contention displays great ignorance and lack of learning. For the components of the being of a composite do not become composite, but rather, in comparison with what is composed from them, though they may be composite in themselves, they are none the less said to be simple. Thus our body being composite, because a living being is composed of it and of a soul, is said to be simple in comparison, and the like of similar things. If, therefore, even composites are in comparison with their components simple and are called so, how can it not be wholly unreasonable for them to say that simples in the intelligible content of their substance, if their aggregation produces something, will therefore be composite? For in that case even whiteness of which the white body of a subject has been composed, will not be simple, but composite. For if what have been joined in the composition of something necessarily become composite, the whiteness of the white lead too will necessarily be composite. So too will every predicate which has produced the body of any subject. Now if the whiteness of white lead is composite, and every composite is composed of various others, then whiteness also will have been composed of various others. But if the components of the composite must be composite, in the way the argument has shown, then each of the components of whiteness will also be composite, and therefore these also will be composed of others. And each one of them being composed, they will be from others and this ad infinitum. As the latter is much more absurd than the former, it is false and absurd to say that those which enter into a composition become composite themselves for how must it not be huge folly to say that, by a quaternity's being composed of four units, each of the units is composite and not simple, because each of them is the fourth part of the composition. For each unit, qua unit, is simple and not composite. Thus even our soul would not be a simple but a composite substance, because a living being is composed of it and of the body. Likewise also matter and form, which produce bodies, would be composite. Now it is likely that somebody who says this erroneously holds that the properties of those which somehow have entered into union have perished; this we have frequently shown above to be false. Hence, just as the incorporeality, impassibility, immortality and eternity of God the Logos are truly preserved, though he has been united to a passible body, which had a beginning of existence: so also have the simplicity and immortality of his substance been preserved without diminution in the composite Christ.

Now some also raise the following doubt: "If Christ is composed of divinity and humanity, then the divinity is a part of the composite, but if it is a part, it is not complete. Therefore it is less than the composite, since the part is less than the whole and the incomplete less than the complete". But people who say this err, since "part" belongs to what are "in relation to something". For nothing on its own is a part. "Part" is said with respect to a whole. For a part is part of a whole. If therefore a part is in relation to something, then it is incomplete in relation to something and less in relation to something. Take the example of a moving ship, for a ship it truly is, because each accompaniment of its operation is recognizable. For the pilot is a part of it, the same way as the charioteer is of the chariot. For the ship is viewed as a whole along with those who direct it, and a carriage or chariot is a whole along with the charioteer who directs it. Hence in this respect the pilot is a part of the whole ship and the charioteer of the carriage too, and as a part he is incomplete, but he is not simply a part or simply incomplete. For if we regard each not simply as a man, but as pilot and as charioteer, each is a part of them, the one of the carriage, the other of the ship, and as a part he is incomplete. But if we just view them simply as men, a man is not a part of something or incomplete. For even our soul, in relation to the composite and the use of it, is a part and in this respect incomplete. When seen on its own, however, it is not a part of something, but complete and more valuable than a composite living being, since the intellectual and incorporeal life of the soul is much more valuable than the things of this world which accompany the body and are relative to the body, because pure intellectuality and incorporeality are more valuable than the body. Thus electrum which is constituted of gold and silver, has, as a part, gold, and in this respect gold is incomplete and inferior to electrum, when we look at the usefulness of electrum. When viewed on its own, gold is complete and not a part and more valuable than the composite. On behalf of this, innumerable other examples of this sort could be produced. Now we should consider Our Lord Christ too in this way. For in relation to its employment in the divine dispensation, the divinity of the Logos is a part of the composite Christ, since our salvation has not been brought about otherwise than through the Incarnation of God the Logos. In relation to this, therefore, each of the entrants into union is incomplete. As for the divinity in and by itself, which is not akin to anything, it is far beyond perfection and beyond comparison with every existent. But they will certainly not think that it is the sort of thing which is a part in relation to something and is inferior in relation to something and is incomplete in relation to something. For that is a sophism and quite alien to an apodeictic discipline.

Perhaps someone, disinclined to the examples I have previously given, may raise a doubt: "If the intellectual life of the soul is more valuable than life in the body and in relation to the body, and if gold is more valuable than electrum and simples are more valuable than composites, does then not a certain inferiority affect the divinity of the Logos, on entering into union with the human nature, since, when considered on its own unattached, it is superior to a composite which participates in the inferior, namely human nature?" Well, perhaps this contention would have a rationale, if, just as gold is changed when mixed with silver and the soul when operating with the body as a result of its bond of affection is inferior to it when it is operating intellectually and unattached to the body, so the divine nature underwent change and variation in its union with human nature. But as shown above, it has been generally acknowledged by all of us who proclaim the things of Christ that in Christ the divine nature has persisted wholly without change, i.e. the divinity of the Logos will be just as it was both before and after the union with human nature. Since even the rational soul, qua being capable of suffering, namely in its operation, suffers in some respects and is changed by its natural link with the body and by the affection through it, however, qua being incapable of suffering in the intelligible content of substance, it remains no less impassible and immortal, even if it is linked with the passible and changeable body. Therefore the wholly invariable and immutable in all his attributes, God the Logos, "in relation to whom is no change, neither shadow of variation", remains as he is, though he was joined in union with human nature. How can the effective causes of sufferings affect him who transcends all change and variation? Not to mention that he gives being to all things that are in the way they are.

We have hereby shown, then, that, the composite being one, its nature, too, will necessarily be and be called one. But since we should be examiners of arguments and not opponents of those who do not estimate anything more than the truth, we should proceed to examine as best we can the questions which our opponents raise, to see whether they agree with truth and the nature of reality. I say, then: If they say that there are two natures of Christ, or that Christ is seen in two natures, in the same way as we say that a whole is seen in the parts or that the parts of a whole are such and such, recognizing the single effect of the union of all of them. If, regarding the two from which Christ results, saying that Christ is "out of two natures" is the same as saying "in two natures", just as, in the case of a triangle, "in three straight lines" "out of three", and thus with all the other aforementioned things, as if there were a difference only about the locution and not about the thing understood by the locution: still, it is necessary that the whole resulting from the two natures should be professed as being something not accidental or a conjunction of substances, and that it must be a nature and substance. If, therefore, they say that there is a single composite nature which exists in two simples, as we say that there is a single whole in many parts: someone will allow this locution, because of a consensus on things which are recognized, even if the locution itself is imprecise for in the case of composites, all the more if they result in mutual composition, we are accustomed to use "out of them" rather than "in them". Thus we say that fire is constituted "out of" heal, dryness and lightness, and not that it is "in" them, and, furthermore, we say that man is composed "out of soul and body and not "in" soul and body, and that all bodies are composed entirely "out of" matter and form and not " in" matter and form. For even though we say that a whole is in parts, we are accustomed to use this of parts that are spatially distinct, such as of the parts of a house, e.g. walls, roof and likewise of the parts of our body, with mutually resembling parts, bones, nerves, veins and the like, and of the organs, hands, head etc., even though they are united to the whole for these are parts properly speaking. If, however, the constituents are not spatially distinct, but pervade the whole, no one who has been instructed to use language about such things properly ever used "in two" or "in many" of things like that. Who among the experts in natural things anywhere said that natural things are "in" matter and form, and not rather "out of" matter and form, or, again, that man is "in" soul and body and not rather "out of soul and body. Hence if the divinity of Christ is not spatially separate from his soul and from his body, but is united to them in their infinite entirety from the moment it entered them, no one uses "in two natures" of it, properly speaking, but rather "out of two natures". Still, as I have said, if they acknowledge his totality as composite, for Christ is composite, we shall permit them to say that he is "in" those two natures out of which he is, even if they use the locution improperly, as we have shown. But if they are fully proved nowhere at all to call the whole of him "one composite nature" and refrain from affirming it as if it were an absurdity, then we too shall justly blame the locution "in two".

For "in something" is not customarily used in one way i.e. "whole in parts". It is I think acknowledged by everyone that it has many meanings, and I consider it unnecessary to say anything about it since we also use the phrase "in something" of divided things, if e.g. we say that the human species is seen in each individual, in Peter, Paul etc., and there being one nature of living being qua living being, it is "in" many species of living being, "in" horses, "in" men, "in" oxen etc. Furthermore, we say that the one substance of the Holy Trinity is "in" three hypostases, and that someone is "in" a city and "in" a house and "in" a ship, but also that " in" the superior there are those subject to him, as the Apostle even says regarding God: "In him we live, and are moved, and are" (Acts 17:28). Likewise wine "in" a vessel and bodies "in" a place, and everything that is created "in" time, and of many other things of this sort; and none of this kind of things is recognized as in one hypostasis, that is, in one individual. For time is other than the things "in" time, and a place than the things "in" a place. There are numerically many individuals in which the common species is seen, and, furthermore, three hypostases into which the divine nature is divided. Hence those who do not confess that Christ is one composite nature, but, on the contrary, dare to anathematize those who say so; we must then of necessity understand that Christ is "in" two natures not as a whole "in" parts, but, as it pleases the impious Nestorius, as in two hypostases or individuals. If they say that they do not think so, but that they turn their faces away from such thinkers as from impious people, none the less the very formula provides no such opportunity for those who adhere to the evil belief of Nestorius and, even more, dare to call Christ not only "in two" but also "two natures". For though those from which he is are two, it is not therefore true to say that the whole is two, as we have shown above with the help of many. It is not the case either that, since there are three straight lines of a triangle, the triangle is somehow therefore three straight lines. Nor, on the other hand, is it possible to say that, since there are many things which concur to make a house, such as stones, bricks and pieces of wood, there are therefore many natures, of a house, or of fire or of any other composite, since each of them consists of many things. For it is unthinkable that a thing should be reverted by its underlying elements, as it were, into the thing itself. For while there are the above mentioned elements of fire, there is one fire, and the elements, so to speak, of the triangle are three straight lines, but the triangle is one.

For what prevents us too, if we change back from the composite to the elements of the composite, from concluding and retorting that its many elements are one and not many, and its nature one and not many? This is what I mean: A triangle is in three straight lines. For the triangle itself is one and not many. Therefore the three straight lines are one and not many. Or in another way: For the triangle there are three straight lines. But the triangle is numerically one. So the three straight lines numerically are one. Again: Fire subsists in heat, lightness and dryness. But there is one nature of fire and not many. Thus heat, dryness and lightness are one nature. However, I think it is clear to those who can see logical connections that a solution is not made in response to all the objections raised but is given in the conclusion itself. For we should conclude the argument as follows: If a house is "in" stones, sidewalls and pieces of wood, but the form of the house is one, then the one form of the house consists "in" stones, sidewalls and pieces of wood. Furthermore: If a triangle is one figure "in" three straight lines, then the one figure of the triangle consists "in" three straight lines and likewise of fire and of all composites.

Epilogue: Thus, therefore, even if Christ be spoken of as in two natures, still there will not necessarily be two natures of that same Christ who is the product of the two. Yet again we repeat: Christ is in two natures, and Christ is one, hence the two natures are one and not two. But in assailing people who pride themselves on these things with this sort of solution, we will neither, because Christ is one, deny the constituents of this "one", nor, on the other hand, because we recognize two natures which have concurred into the union, will we not confess that "one" which resulted from them; whether someone prefers to call it one nature or hypostasis or one Christ, makes no difference to us. For the rest will necessarily be implied by each of these. For Christ being one, his hypostasis and nature must be one, by his being. If that "one" is not going to become many, he must also be one nature and hypostasis. For how can what remain numerically two be numerically one being? For in that way someone might say that there is be one hypostasis of stones and of pieces of wood, even if they touch one another. That the same should be both one and two is impossible. On the other hand, he whose nature is one mean each one's particular nature, according to the distinction drawn between them above must also be one hypostasis.

So it is, as far as our capacities go. Now we ask those who read this to stand up dispassionately and without favoritism so that they may give an answer to truth itself in accordance with our defense of it. And if they find anything said by us agreeable to it, they should embrace it with welcome understanding, ungrudgingly, as if it were their own offspring. For I consider truth a common benefit in whomsoever it is found. But if anything has slipped from our judgment or examination, may they grant us forgiveness for our slip, but heal what they have forgiven by themselves through clearly proven rebuttals, judging, as we do, that our own private good lies in dissociation from ignorance and in making him who has liberated us from it our true helper.